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copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at this
address and affixed a copy to the door of the same premises. The
court held that such service satisfied due process requirements.
In so doing, it attempted to distinguish Polansky by showing that
in that case an affidavit was produced stating that the defendant
had left the address at which service was made "some time ago."
However, in the instant case, only an unsigned post office notation
stating that the defendant had moved was introduced into evidence.
The court relied on Dobkin for the proposition that plaintiff's
knowledge that the defendant no longer resides at the last known
address where service is made does not vitiate such service. The fact
that Dobkin arose under 308(4), while Brown arose under 308(3),
was of no moment, since the Brown court felt that if the service
in Dobkin satisfied due process, "then it would appear that service
pursuant to CPLR 308'20 (subd. [3]) would also satisfy the requirements of due process.
Remaining, however, is the apparent conflict between the first
and second departments on the question of whether substituted
service is valid when directed at an address at which plaintiff knows
the defendant does not reside. Only the Court of Appeals and,
possibly, the United States Supreme Court can resolve this problem.
It is submitted that the first department's holding in Polansky
is more consistent with traditional concepts of due process. It is
difficult to see how service directed at an address known to be
incorrect can be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of
the pendency of a suit.2 '
ARTICLE

22 -STAY,

MOTIONS, ORDERS AND MANDATES

CPLR 2219(a): Validity of order unaffected by failure of court
to decide motion within time limitation.
According to CPLR 2219(a), an order determining a motion
relating to a provisional remedy shall be made within twenty days,
and an order determining any other motion shall be made within
sixty days, after such motion is submitted for decision. A recent
20 Id. at 414, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
2"It should also be noted that the instant decision tends to extend the

limits of CPLR 303(3) further than the legislature intended. The statute
clearly states that when service under 308(1) cannot be made with due
diligence, then service is to be made "by mailing the summons to the person
to be served at his last known residence and either affixing the Summons to
the door of his place of business, dwelling house or itsual place of abode... :'
(Emphasis added.) The language of the statute appears to indicate that the
legislature did not intend that the "nailing" and mailing be both made at
the defendant's last known residence, as in the instant case. See McK-mmf's
CPLR, supp. commentary 133 (1965).
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supreme court case, Kaminsky v. Abrams,22 ruled that an order
denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, made after
the sixty-day period, would not be void, since the provisions
of CPLR 2219(a) were merely precatory. 23 In arriving at this
result, the court reasoned that, as a matter of general statutory
interpretation, a provision directing action by a public officer within
a stated time, in -the absence of negative words restraining action
thereafter, should be regarded as merely directory, rather than
as a-limitation on the officer's authority.
The court also stated that the plaintiff was estopped from
attacking the order, since one entitled to the relief here sought, i.e.,
the vacating of the order denying plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and the granting of summary judgment to defendants,
should not await an unfavorable disposition before moving for
such relief.
It has been suggested that a party considering himself
aggrieved by a court's unwarranted delay might, by mandamus,
compel the court to render a decision.2 ' However, such a course
is usually inadvisable since the court might not be favorably inclined
towards the party seeking mandamus. Also, where, as in Kaminsky,
the motion was decided only three days after the expiration of
the sixty-day period, mandamus would be an ineffective and meaningless remedy in preventing such a minor delay.
The general purpose of time provisions, such as those found in
CPLR 2219(a), is to provide system, uniformity, and promptness
in the conduct of public business? 5 Since a party has no effective
control over a court's action, it would be a harsh construction which
would deprive him. of the benefits of an order because of the courts
failure to decide a motion by a particular day.
ARTICLE

31-

DiSCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(b): Accident reports made by self-insurer to independent firm of private investigatorsmay be privileged matter.
Holding that accident reports made to a liability insurer were
material prepared for litigation, and therefore immune from disclosure under CPLR 3101(d), the appellate division, first department, in Kandel v. Tocher,26 did not find it "necessary . . to
determine whether reports, investigation, and statements received
22 51
23

Misc. 2d 5, 272 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).

See also Leumi Financial Corp. v. Richter (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), 153

March 29, 1965, p. 15, col. 4.
NY.L.J.,
24
See Fallon v. Hattemer, 229 App. Div. 397, 342 N.Y. Supp. 93 (2d
Dep't 1930).
"25 Ibid.
2622 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).

